Abstract:
The transition to federalism in Nepal envisioned a decentralized security architecture, where provincial governments would exercise authority over police administration as guaranteed by the Constitution. However, nearly a decade after the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal, the police adjustment process remains largely unimplemented. This study argues that the failure is not primarily due to legislative absence but is rooted in structural centralism, administrative inertia, and the absence of a transparent transition model.
Using doctrinal analysis and policy review the study identifies five key impediments: persistence of a unitary mindset, procedural delay, lack of merit-based transition, jurisdictional ambiguity, and resource centralization. The findings suggest that Nepal’s federal experiment in policing is constrained by entrenched institutional behavior rather than constitutional limitations. The paper concludes that without a transparent, rule-based adjustment mechanism and genuine political commitment, Nepal’s federal policing structure will remain functionally incomplete.
Keywords:
Federalism, Police Adjustment, Jurisdictional Conflict, Legal Centralism,
Method of Study:
This study adopts a qualitative and comparative research design. It primarily relies on doctrinal analysis of constitutional provisions, statutory laws, and policy documents, complemented by interpretive analysis of administrative practices. The research draws on secondary sources including academic literature, government reports, and institutional publications. The time span of the study covers the period from the promulgation of Nepal’s Constitution in 2015 to the present status of police adjustment. Informal insights from administrative experience and stakeholder observations are also incorporated to capture lived institutional realities. The triangulation of legal texts, empirical observations, and comparative evidence enhances the reliability and analytical depth of the study.
Conflict of Interest:
I declare that I have no financial or institutional conflict of interest. However, professional administrative experience informs interpretive insights used in this academic analysis.
Ethical Consideration:
This study adheres to academic integrity, ensuring proper acknowledgment of sources and avoidance of misrepresentation. Sensitive institutional issues are discussed with analytical neutrality and without targeting individuals. Lived experiences are generalized to protect confidentiality. The research maintains objectivity while critically examining public policy and administrative practices.
Overview:
Federal restructuring in Nepal marked a transformative shift from a centralized governance system to a multi-level political order. The Constitution of Nepal explicitly assigns “provincial police administration and law and order” as an exclusive provincial power under Schedule 6. Despite this constitutional clarity, the operationalization of federal policing has remained incomplete. The enactment of the Police Personnel Adjustment Act, 2076 and the Nepal Police and Provincial Police (Operation, Supervision and Coordination) Act, 2076 was expected to facilitate institutional transition, yet their implementation has stalled.
This paper situates the problem within the broader tension between constitutional federalism and administrative centralism. While legal provisions formally endorse decentralization, entrenched institutional practices continue to resist devolution. The resulting jurisdictional conflicts have created a governance vacuum, where provincial authorities lack effective control over security institutions.
The central claim advanced is that Nepal’s challenge lies not in constitutional design but in the absence of a transparent, merit-based and time-bound transition mechanism. The analysis therefore moves beyond legal interpretation to examine deeper structural and behavioral constraints within the state apparatus.
Discussion and Analysis:
1. Persistence of Unitary Mindset
A foundational obstacle to police federalization in Nepal is the persistence of a deeply embedded unitary administrative culture. Although federalism has been constitutionally adopted, institutional behavior continues to reflect centralized control. The Police Personnel Adjustment Act, 2076, rather than facilitating genuine decentralization, retains federal dominance over senior ranks such as Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) and above. This effectively positions provincial police structures as subordinate extensions of the central authority.
From a theoretical perspective, Ronald Watts’ analysis of federal systems emphasizes that successful federalism requires both constitutional division of powers and corresponding administrative adaptation. In Nepal’s case, while the former exists, the latter remains incomplete. The reluctance to devolve authority reflects what can be termed “legal centralism”—a condition where legal frameworks appear decentralized, but operational control remains centralized.
Empirical observations further reinforce this argument. Provincial governments frequently report limited authority in commanding police forces during emergencies. This disconnect between constitutional mandate and administrative practice illustrates the dominance of centralized institutional logic. Thus, the persistence of a unitary mindset is not merely a bureaucratic issue but a structural constraint that undermines the functional realization of federal policing in Nepal.
2. Strategic Procedural Delay
Another critical challenge is the use of procedural mechanisms to delay implementation. Despite the passage of relevant legislation, the police adjustment process has not progressed meaningfully even after nine years of constitutional adoption. This delay cannot be explained solely by technical complexity; rather, it reflects a pattern of “procedural frustration,” where decision-making is repeatedly deferred through committees, reviews, and administrative processes.
The absence of a clear implementation timeline further exacerbates this issue. Policy stagnation has created uncertainty among stakeholders, particularly within the police force. Officers remain unclear about their future roles, career progression, and institutional affiliation, leading to resistance and inertia.
From a governance perspective, such delays weaken public trust in federal institutions. Reports from bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission highlight the implications of institutional ambiguity on service delivery and justice mechanisms. When provincial governments lack effective control over policing, accountability structures become blurred, affecting citizens’ access to security and justice.
In my view, the amalgamation of eleven police agencies was completed through clearly defined stages, supported by strong political commitment. The contrast underscores the importance of decisive leadership and procedural clarity in managing institutional transitions.
3. Lack of Merit-Based Transition Mechanism
The absence of a transparent and merit-based adjustment framework has significantly contributed to resistance within the police institution. Federal restructuring inevitably disrupts established hierarchies, making it essential to design transition mechanisms that protect professional integrity and career progression.
In Nepal, no comprehensive rank-audit or seniority protection system has been implemented. This has generated widespread concern among officers regarding potential demotion, stagnation, or politicization at the provincial level. As a result, many personnel prefer to remain within the federal structure, reinforcing centralization.
Administrative theory suggests that institutional change is more likely to succeed when it aligns with the incentives and expectations of key actors. In this case, the lack of a fair and predictable transition mechanism has created disincentives for compliance. The adjustment process is therefore perceived not as an opportunity for reform but as a risk to professional stability.
South Africa addressed similar challenges by introducing standardized integration criteria, ensuring that personnel from different forces were absorbed into the new system based on transparent and equitable principles. This reduced resistance and facilitated institutional cohesion.
From my perspective, the Nepali experience highlights that legal provisions alone are insufficient; effective implementation requires attention to organizational behavior, professional norms, and incentive structures.
4. The ‘Grey Zone’ of Jurisdictional Conflict
I argue that, jurisdictional ambiguity represents a central feature of Nepal’s federal policing dilemma. While the Constitution assigns policing powers to provinces, subsequent legislation introduces overlapping authority. The Nepal Police and Provincial Police (Operation, Supervision and Coordination) Act, 2076 allows the federal government to intervene in provincial policing under broadly defined conditions, effectively creating a “grey zone” of authority.
This ambiguity leads to conflicting interpretations of power between federal and provincial actors. In practice, it enables the central government to override provincial decisions, undermining the autonomy envisaged by the Constitution. Such overlap not only creates administrative confusion but also weakens accountability, as it becomes unclear which level of government is responsible for specific outcomes.
Legal scholars, including Bipin Adhikari, have emphasized the importance of clear functional delineation in federal systems. Without it, federalism risks devolving into symbolic decentralization without substantive autonomy.
Lived experiences further illustrate this challenge. Provincial ministers have expressed frustration over their inability to exercise effective control over law enforcement agencies, particularly during crises. This disconnect between authority and responsibility creates governance inefficiencies and erodes public confidence.
5. Resource Centralization and Functional Paralysis
Finally, the centralization of resources remains a critical barrier to effective federal policing. Key assets such as training institutions, infrastructure, and logistics are retained by the federal government. This creates a situation where provincial police structures, even if formally established, lack the capacity to function independently.
Resource dependency reinforces hierarchical control, as provinces must rely on federal institutions for operational support. This undermines the principle of autonomy and limits the effectiveness of decentralized governance.
Data indicates that Nepal has approximately 79,000 police personnel, yet their distribution and deployment remain centrally managed. Provincial disparities in police-to-population ratios further highlight the inequities in resource allocation.
From a public administration perspective, decentralization without resource devolution leads to what can be termed “functional paralysis.” Institutions exist in form but lack the means to perform their assigned roles.
This indicates that, Nepal’s challenge, therefore, is not only to adjust personnel but also to reconfigure the material and financial foundations of policing.
Conclusion:
The analysis demonstrates that Nepal’s stalled police adjustment process is fundamentally a problem of institutional behavior rather than constitutional design. Despite clear legal provisions supporting federal policing, the persistence of centralist practices, procedural delays, lack of merit-based transition mechanisms, jurisdictional ambiguity, and resource centralization have collectively impeded progress.
A closer examination reveals that successful federal restructuring requires more than legislative action. It demands political commitment, administrative clarity, and carefully designed transition mechanisms that align with institutional incentives. Nepal’s experience illustrates the risks of partial reform, where legal changes are not matched by corresponding shifts in practice.
Moving forward, the establishment of a transparent, rule-based adjustment framework is essential. This should include clear timelines, protection of professional integrity, and equitable resource distribution. Equally important is the need to redefine intergovernmental relations to ensure that provincial autonomy is respected while maintaining national coordination.
Overall, the evidence demonstrates, the success of federal policing in Nepal will depend on the willingness of state institutions to move beyond inherited centralist tendencies and embrace the principles of shared governance envisioned in the Constitution.
Authored by Kumar Ghising researcher and public policy analyst.
References
- Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems
- Bipin Adhikari, The Constitution of Nepal
- South African Police Service Act, 1995
- National Human Rights Commission Reports (Nepal)
- Constitution of Nepal,
- The Police Personnel Adjustment Act, 2076
- Nepal Police and Provincial Police (Operation, Supervision and Coordination) Act, 2076